Misinformation about Fukushima is a threat to the future. It is time to re-establish some truth on the subject.

A comprehensive document on “17 Little-Known Facts of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Caused by the Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami” contains the little-understood facts about the accident, in-depth and accessible explanations, a list of reliable sources for more demaning readers and a data sheet including key figures.

17 little-known facts

about the Fukushima nuclear accident caused by the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami

1. The radioactive releases from the accident at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant resulted in exposure of the population so low that 10 years later no casualties have been recorded and no observable increase in cancer or death is expected.

According to the final conclusions of the scientific committee established by the United Nations and the WHO (UNSCEAR), no cases of death or cancer have been recorded, and none are expected, due to the exposure of populations, workers or emergency responders to radioactive emissions from the damaged power plant. Three people died in construction accidents unrelated to radioactivity, and one person who had filed suit was awarded compensation to which TEPCO, the Fukushima operator, consented despite no link having been established between the complainant’s cancer and the doses received during the accident (74 mSv)*.

The radioactive releases from the Fukushima accident, ten times lower than those from Chernobyl, exposed the population to doses up to the order of magnitude of those received during a medical scan.

The tsunami (more than 90% of the victims), the earthquake (approximately 10%) and other industrial accidents (more than thirty victims) including the rupture of the Fujinuma dam (eight casualties), are responsible for more than 18 500 deaths and disappearances in Japan on March 11, 2011.

* UNSCEAR (United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) is a UN body responsible for evaluating the effects of ionizing radiation on humans. This scientific committee operates on the same principle as the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).

** For a one-time dose of radioactivity, no health effect has been observed below a dose of 100 mSv.

SOURCES AND REFERENCES

2. The natural disaster of March 11, 2011 (the Tōhoku earthquake followed by the tsunami) is responsible for nearly 18,500 direct victims. It also caused some fifty industrial accidents, which themselves had health and environmental consequences. However, the world has mainly focused on the nuclear accident at Fukushima despite a considerably lower health record.
3. The radioactive releases from the nuclear accident had no observable impact, and none is expected, on terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems beyond the immediate surroundings of the plant.
4. The level of radioactivity in the Fukushima region today is comparable to natural radioactivity in many parts of the world with no proven impact on health.
5. Discharge of “radioactive” water containing tritium to the sea (expected from 2022) will have no impact on ecosystems. The water will immediately return to concentrations compatible with the recommendations for drinking water.

    • Following the accident, damage to the structures led to infiltration of water (rain, groundwater, etc.) into the buildings of the Fukushima power plant which are ongoing; in contact with the debris and the reactor core (fuel), it becomes contaminated with radioactive elements. After being pumped, collected, decontaminated and then stored in large tanks around the plant, this water now amounts to around 1.2 million m3 stored on the plant site.

      As the reactor site will be full by 2022, the Japanese authorities, on the recommendation of international bodies, plan to discharge this water to the sea once its radioactive content has been reduced to levels similar to normal discharges from an operating nuclear power plant, with no impact on the environment.

      This water is called “tritiated water” because it contains tritium, an element that is not very radioactive nor very radiotoxic and has a short half-life. Tritium cannot be separated from the water molecule since is it part of it; it must thus be included in the discharges, in a quantity greater than normal discharges from nuclear power plants.

      Taking into account the dilution of the tritiated water in seawater, these discharges, potentially conducted at some distance from the plant, will lead to a tritium concentration in the seawater 10,000 times lower than the threshold set by the World Health Organization for drinking water.

      Under the expected discharge conditions, there is therefore no risk to health or the environment.

      The difficulties are primarily economic and societal since the majority of the population is not informed about the real risks of these releases. The authorities fear in particular image costs which could again hurt the fishermen of Fukushima prefecture or be used as a means of pressure by foreign countries in the framework of trade negotiations.

      SOURCES AND REFERENCES

6. An earthquake and tsunami of the magnitude of those of March 11, 2011 in Japan are not possible in France. Even if an accident with fuel melting is possible, it remains very unlikely and its consequences would likely be much less severe.

    • An earthquake followed by a tsunami of the magnitude compared to those that led in Japan to the Fukushima accident isn’t likely to occur in France. However, despite their very low probability of occurrence, accidents with core melt are taken into account in the safety analysis.

      All European nuclear power plants are thus equipped with several redundant systems to prevent this type of accident from occurring, and to limit releases into the environment outside of the site if it does occur. In its analysis carried out after the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN), independent from the government and industry, concluded that “[…] nuclear power plants appear to be robust vis-à-vis the hazards considered in the design basis [note: earthquake, flooding in particular]”. These safety assessments also take into account the spent fuel pools at the reactors.

      The flooding of the Blayais nuclear power plant during a severe 1999 storm was classified as level 2 on the INES international nuclear event scale, nothing like the Fukushima accident (level 7 on a scale of 7): the plant demonstrated robustness and resilience despite flooding. However, full experience feedback from Blayais has been incorporated at all French nuclear power plants, which today present a high level of protection against this type of risk as well.

      SOURCES AND REFERENCES

7. The prolonged shutdown of Japanese nuclear power plants following the Fukushima accident abruptly deprived the country of 30% of its electricity, which is, even today, largely replaced by fossil fuels (coal and natural gas), considerably increasing Japan’s greenhouse gas emissions.
8. Following the Fukushima nuclear accident, many countries closed safe and operational nuclear power plants or put an end to their construction projects, negatively and lastingly impacting global efforts to fight global warming.

    • The Fukushima accident and its aftermath in the media have had a significant negative impact on the fight against climate change. The fear caused by this accident — legitimate just after the accident and as long as the uncertainty remained — was instrumentalised and artificially perpetuated by the anti-nuclear movement and led to a general loss of trust. This brought a real halt to many civilian nuclear programs around the world. While some countries like China only suspended their programs, others took more drastic measures.

      While the German government was planning to extend the lifespan of its nuclear power plants, Germany immediately decided to shut down 8 GW of the country’s 22 GW of nuclear power gradually, with a complete exit in 2022. Switzerland halted the renewal of its reactor fleet, Japan closed its reactors indefinitely.

      Beyond these very visible consequences, the major impact was much more insidious. The turning of public opinion against nuclear power on the basis of disinformation and a sustained media campaign on the topic strongly destabilized the nuclear industry, which depends heavily on stable, long-term policies. Subjected to an unfavourable, even hostile, political, regulatory and financial environment, the nuclear industry is still experiencing very significant difficulties in keeping alive and developing in markets which are moreover biased against it.

      SOURCES AND REFERENCES

9. By 2035, it is estimated that there could be up to 260,000 premature deaths in the world and nearly 17.8 billion tonnes of CO2 emitted (i.e. 6 months of global emissions), due to fossil-fueled generating capacity that replaced the operational and safe nuclear power plants that were shut down following the Fukushima accident.

    • The health and climate toll of the premature closure of operational and safe nuclear power plants is estimated at 260,000 deaths and nearly 17.8 billion tonnes of CO2 emitted (i.e. 6 months of global emissions) by 2035.

      Following the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, Germany immediately decided to abandon the ongoing review of its energy transition policy to use to nuclear power in order to accelerate the exit from coal, and instead to shut down 8 out of 17 operating nuclear reactors and bring forward the deadline for closing the others to 2022.

      To be sure, this policy has not increased CO2 emissions from the electricity sector, thanks to the development of wind and solar energies and energy savings in the residential sector. But developing those low-carbon, intermittent energy sources at the same pace while closing coal-fired power stations rather than nuclear power stations, would have helped avoid the emission of 1.4 billion tons of CO2 and the premature death of 21,000 people over the period 2011-2035.

      With nuclear power, Germany could have resolutely begun its transition to a low-carbon economy rather than simply prevent the increase of its emissions.

      In Japan, the shutdown of operational nuclear reactors led to an increase of nearly 200 million tonnes of CO2 emissions per year between 2010 and 2012. Over the period 2011-2035, 2.2 billion tonnes of CO2 and the deaths of 23,300 people would have been avoided had they remained online.

      The effects of energy poverty are also an aspect that is increasingly being included in public health assessments. Thus, a study by the NBER* estimates at 1,280 (and as many as 4,500) the number of deaths from cold in Japan following the sudden increase in electricity prices (+ 38%) caused by the shutdown of nuclear reactors that provided competitively priced electricity.

      *NBER stands for National Bureau of Economic Research, an American non-profit organization devoted to economics.

      SOURCES AND REFERENCES

10. Public perception of nuclear risk and its consequences (probability and severity of accidents) is disproportionate to reality.

    • The French Institute for Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety conducts an annual public opinion study measuring the French population’s perception of risks, including nuclear and radiological risk.

      The most recent study reveals that 55% of French citizens believe that the Fukushima nuclear accident caused more than 500 deaths, compared to only 4% who believe the accident caused no deaths or between 1 and 10 deaths.

      For 23% of French citizens “the most frightening event” is the Fukushima nuclear accident (despite the fact that no deaths/cancers were found) compared to only 7% for the Haiti earthquake (230,000 deaths) or 6% for the 2003 heat wave in France (19,000 deaths). Moreover, 35% of respondents consider that the strongest (and most important) argument against nuclear power is the risk of an accident. However, the probability of a serious accident is extremely low and its real radiological consequences are likely limited.

      The Fukushima nuclear accident is still regularly presented in the media using names that are each more alarming than the others. That it is “the most serious nuclear accident in the history of the 21st century” is a fact, since it is the only one. But the perception that the public retains from these statements is far from the reality of the accident’s consequences.

      This disproportionate perception is also found in political circles which, consciously or not, perpetuate a general relationship to the accident that is due more to myth than to reality.

      SOURCES AND REFERENCES

11. The main health impact of the accident is a consequence of the evacuation and of fear, that is, the well-being and mental health of affected populations. This impact is only made worse by outrageous media treatment, anxiety-provoking communication from militant anti-nuclear movements, and stigmatization by the rest of the population.

    • Although the radioactive releases had extremely limited consequences on the environment and the public, the evacuation conducted in response to the accident had very significant consequences on the well-being and mental health of the residents and workers of Fukushima Prefecture. This conclusion by UNSCEAR* takes into consideration the trauma of the evacuation, the impact that the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident had on the population, but also the fear of radiation, the long-term separation and the stigma associated with having been exposed to ionizing radiation during the accident.

      The World Health Organisation (WHO) also reports the results of a study that reveals a strong correlation between the level of doses received by workers and their high psychological stress in relation to the potential danger of exposure. It appears that they were also victims of discrimination and harassment from the rest of the population, and that many women expressed reluctance to conceive a child for fear of the social judgment associated with the alleged genetic impact of radiation exposure.

      Finally, we note that former residents of Fukushima prefecture are reluctant to reveal their former place of residence when they move, because of the discrimination they know they could face.

      This focus, whose real harmful effects on the health and well-being of the public could have been avoided, also has the characteristic of downgrading the victims of the earthquake and tsunami and the pain of their survivors .

      This instrumentalisation is the work of some anti-nuclear movements and politicians who have chosen to make the Fukushima accident a symbol of something it is not. It also echoes the question that needs to be asked about the role of the media and social networks. WHO has taken this issue up in its report, which points to the responsibility of information playing on emotion and not scientifically established, and of rumours that feed fear, which have contributed to anxiety, confusion and division in society.

      SOURCES AND REFERENCES

      • Maeda, 2017 https://doi.org/10.1177/1010539516689695
      • Rapport OMS : https://apps.who.int/iris/rest/bitstreams/1318032/retrieve – Page 15 – 26
      • Specific work on the value of systematic screening for thyroid cancer was carried out in 2018 by a group of experts from the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC, Thyroid monitoring after nuclear accident (TM-NUC) http://tmnuc.iarc.fr/en/. It recommends that priority be given to making screening facilities available to high-risk groups of individuals, combined with detailed information on the risks of over-diagnosis for patients and families
12. Recent research calls into question the magnitude, suddenness and duration of the evacuations around Fukushima, the impact of which on the health of the populations concerned is said to be ultimately more severe than would have been the effect of the radioactive releases if these people had stayed home or returned more quickly.
13. The negative image surrounding food produced in Japan has heavily impacted the Japanese economy and local producers who still find it difficult to make a living from their production, which nevertheless fully complies with consumption standards.
14. Many political figures, anti-nuclear associations and the media contribute to the confusion between the victims of the natural disaster and the nuclear accident in Fukushima, instrumentalizing (intentionally or not) the memory of the victims and the drama of Japan and the Japanese people.

    • The disaster in the Tōhoku region of Japan was caused by a tsunami, which was in turn caused by an underwater earthquake. Villages, hamlets, schools, hospitals, retirement homes, shopping centres, industrial areas, all of them filled with people, were swept away by the giant wave. The coastal region was completely devastated, and the tsunami killed nearly 18,500 people.

      And yet, this tragedy and its victims now seem condemned to remain forever in the shadow of the nuclear accident, also a consequence of these natural events. From the day after the disaster, and almost without interruption since, a multitude of public actors have undertaken what constitutes the opposite of a work of memory: a work of omission, even of manipulation. Politicians, activists, associations, the media, anonymous people on social networks – the motley crowd of those who see this natural disaster only through the prism of their anti-nuclear dogma – have begun the work of rewriting history. Through press releases, public statements, reports, articles or simple posts, and depending on the level of credulity or cynicism of their respective authors, these victims have disappeared or become consequences of the nuclear disaster.

      The declarations of scientific committees such as WHO and UNSCEAR confirming that the radioactive releases from the nuclear power plant did not cause any casualties observable 10 years later, and that none are expected, have not prevented a strong collective imagination from being formed for a majority of the public – a public for whom the name of Fukushima is now associated with that of the nuclear power plant and the thousands of victims that it did not cause.

      Sometimes, the amalgam appears to stem from ignorance, as in the France Inter radio news report of 23 July 2017 which went so far as to attribute the tsunami itself and its victims to the nuclear accident. Sometimes, it is done by omission – the victims are glossed over in favour of mentions of the nuclear accident. Worse, some public figures contribute to the stigmatisation of people who fled the region, or people who are still trying to make a living there, with their opportunistic communication.

      The 10th anniversary of the events of March 2011 is unfortunately a new opportunity to see this communication at work. It is up to us, collectively, to help restore the respect due to the victims.

      SOURCES AND REFERENCES

15. Before the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Japanese Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency was dysfunctional and lacked independence from the government and energy companies.

    • Before the Fukushima accident, the Japanese safety agency was not sufficiently independent from the operator and not sufficiently prescriptive vis-à-vis the latter. One of the first measures taken after the accident was therefore to create the current authority (NRA), which has the power to prescribe, shut down reactors and authorize their restart.

      The agency at the time did not prescribe to the operator a protective dike height consistent with the historical earthquakes and tsunamis in the area. The devices that would have limited radioactive releases in the event of an accident in the reactor building, which were present in most Western and Chinese reactors at the time, were not required, nor were the very simple systems that could have prevented the hydrogen explosions observed and the subsequent release of radioactive elements into the atmosphere.

      Today, all the reactors in the world concerned, with measures adapted for each type of reactor, are equipped with this type of devices. French reactors were equipped well before 2011.

      SOURCES AND REFERENCES

16. The analysis and experience gained from this accident, which should not be underestimated and which could have been avoided, have made it possible to improve the level of safety of nuclear reactors, in Japan and around the world, with the active and immediate participation of the global nuclear industry.

    • The important feedback from the accident has allowed for further improvements in nuclear safety in Japan and around the world.

      After the Fukushima accident, the Japanese safety agency was dissolved and then reformed. New safety standards were presented in July 2013, concerning the design of reactors, protection against earthquakes and tsunamis as well as the limitation of the consequences of severe accidents.

      In the minutes following the accident, the global nuclear industry provided assistance, whether in terms of expertise, post-accident crisis management, or logistical support that was lacking due to the scale of the earthquake and tsunami disaster.

      In the following months, all the operators and safety authorities, R&D centres as well as equipment and service suppliers mobilized with a twofold objective: to take the immediate measures that TEPCO lacked (in particular, protective devices against atmospheric releases and hydrogen explosion) and to launch additional safety studies to analyse the reasons of the accident, in especially those regarding the consideration of major external hazards. These studies led to the establishment of new measures to be implemented in the existing installations, the deployment of which is in its final phase.

      Since the accident, all over the world, improvements have been made to existing plants and feedback has been integrated into new reactor designs such as the EPR. In particular, in France, it has been decided to bring the safety of operating reactors closer to the level of the EPR design, which is a particularly ambitious and exemplary objective, to equip all the power plants with ultimate emergency means for extreme cases (all of which are installed today) and to create the Nuclear Rapid Action Force capable of intervening on any site in less than 24 hours.

      SOURCES AND REFERENCES

17. Reactors at the Onagawa plant, closest to the epicentre, did not suffer major damage in the earthquake. Robust enough to withstand the tsunami, the plant then served as a refuge for local populations.

    • The Onagawa NPP is the closest plant to the epicentre of the 11 March 2011 earthquake (60 km), twice as close as the Fukushima-Daiichi plant. Its reactors are of the same design and model, although more recent. Above all, they are operated by a different operator. In particular, the operator has better designed the plant’s earthquake and tsunami protection based on available historical data for the region.

      During the natural disaster, the populations of the villages closest to the nuclear power plant were able to find refuge in the gymnasium protected from the 14 m high wave by the combined effect of the voluntary elevation of the site, as well as the protections and robustness of the power plant (a larger wave than the one received at Fukushima-Daiichi). The villagers were accommodated for three months while a solution for their relocation was being searched for.

      Of the three reactors at Onagawa, only the first reactor will not be restarted due to the cost of bringing it up to new standards, which is considered too high in relation to its power and remaining life. The second reactor has recently been restarted while the third is waiting for approval to restart.

      SOURCES AND REFERENCES